11/24/09 06:48 am - ephemeral modality
I'm gonna go out on a limb here, and say brentano's theory of intentionality is only part fuckness. From his writings i've developed the idea that a person can't think about nothing. Thinking directly entails that the 'thinking' going on has a content, or is about something (whether real or imaginative). Even further, it's nonsense to claim that it is or is not possible for a person to think without the 'thinking' going on being about something becuz it seems, at least conceptually, that any instance of thinking without content would be unrecognizable to person thinking it becuz there would be no content for them to recognize it by.*
Whether brentano would agree that this interpretation of the 'core' of his theory is along the lines of what he meant idk.
The reason i say this interpretation is an interpretation of the 'core' of his theory is becuz, if i've read brentano's theory accurately, it seems as if brentano thinks the idea that 'thinking is always about something' is some kind of 'fundamental quality' of thinking (a quality which he calls "intentional inexistence"), and that this 'quality' (which is the inherent content-ness in thinking)** is only attributable to thinking, and even further, that we can use this 'quality' to ontologically distinguish mental phenomena from physical phenomena. Apparently brentano's followers are divided about whether he makes any explicit ontological argument tho.. buttttt idgaf becuz brentano's discussion about 'fundamental qualities' is the fuckness i mentioned at the start of this oration:P
I've taken 3 huge shits since i got home and my burps still smell like budweiser. FML
( (footnotes) )
Whether brentano would agree that this interpretation of the 'core' of his theory is along the lines of what he meant idk.
The reason i say this interpretation is an interpretation of the 'core' of his theory is becuz, if i've read brentano's theory accurately, it seems as if brentano thinks the idea that 'thinking is always about something' is some kind of 'fundamental quality' of thinking (a quality which he calls "intentional inexistence"), and that this 'quality' (which is the inherent content-ness in thinking)** is only attributable to thinking, and even further, that we can use this 'quality' to ontologically distinguish mental phenomena from physical phenomena. Apparently brentano's followers are divided about whether he makes any explicit ontological argument tho.. buttttt idgaf becuz brentano's discussion about 'fundamental qualities' is the fuckness i mentioned at the start of this oration:P
I've taken 3 huge shits since i got home and my burps still smell like budweiser. FML
( (footnotes) )

